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American constitutional law, as seen from the academy, seems to be in
serious disarray. The liberal mainstream of academic thought is divided
and increasingly unsure of its theoretical underpinnings as well as of its
influence on the courts. From without, the mainstream is beset by strident
and sometimes telling criticism from left and right. In particular, recent
constitutional scholarship shows a disturbing tendency to adopt by default
a sort of division of labor, with right-wing writers appropriating tradi-
tional concerns with history, left-wing scholars dominating discussion of
the role of communitarian values, and liberals defending a diminished he-
gemony over academic doctrine. In "Beyond the Republican Revival"
Professor Sunstein proposes that we address our problems in much the
same way that earlier constitutionalists wished their contemporaries to re-
solve theirs-by reviving and rethinking a republican tradition that lies,
sometimes forgotten, at the foundation of the constitutional system. In-
deed, one of the truly brilliant aspects of Professor Sunstein's work on
republicanism has been his success in offering what is often quite a far-
reaching critique of current thought on apparently traditional grounds.
Revived republicanism promises to address and reintegrate constitu-
tional themes that recent scholarship has ignored or separated. Contempo-
rary American law, and constitutional law in particular, has been severely
criticized for its inability to make sense of communitarian values and con-
cerns, and its underlying insistence on interpreting society as a collection
of atomized individuals.' Modern republicanism, in contrast, insists that
"the motivating force of political behavior should not be self-interest, nar-
rowly defined, and that civic virtue should play a role in political life";2
the specific role of constitutional law will be to protect and undergird
these communitarian elements in politics.
Contemporary constitutionalism's inability to recognize or foster com-
munity is accompanied by confusion and disagreement over the appropri-
ate role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The school of thought
of which Chief Justice Rehnquist is the most prominent adherent would
t Visiting Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. In a huge and often brilliant literature, see, for example, R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLIT-
ics (1975); E. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE (1987). Powerful arguments that atomistic
individualism is a defining characteristic of late Western civilization are A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIR-
TUE (2d ed. 1984); S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER (1981).
2. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988).
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deny for the most part the validity of any tradition except that already
frozen in the founding events, while other scholars and judges seem so
unconcerned with history as to have no concept of tradition at all. Profes-
sor Sunstein's republicanism, on the other hand, lays claim to deep con-
tinuity with a tradition embedded in the founding events, and yet pos-
sessed of a capacity for change and development.
Another area of current constitutional disarray concerns the nature and
propriety of moral discourse in constitutional law. Much of the liberal
mainstream seems committed to an almost completely process-oriented ac-
count of the moral commitments legitimately to be found within American
law,' while contemporary "conservative" constitutionalists tend either to
identify moral value with wealth-maximization 4 or to adopt moral relativ-
ism in the public sphere.5 Modern republicanism, however, proclaims its
"belief in the possibility of settling at least some normative disputes with
substantively right answers. '
In this comment I shall raise three questions about Professor Sunstein's
republican revival. First, in what way is it genuinely a revival of an ear-
lier political tradition? Second, what is the nature of the "deliberation"
that Professor Sunstein sees as the heart of republican community? Fi-
nally, does his modern republicanism offer a genuine escape from the
proceduralism and skepticism that constitute the ethical core of much of
contemporary constitutional theory?
I. THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION
A prominent feature of Professor Sunstein's republicanism is his claim
to be reviving a very old tradition in American political thought (even if,
as his article carefully points out, revival must be accomplished by re-
thinking). But what does it mean to "revive" a tradition the very existence
of which was and is-contested?7 Professor Sunstein begins his article
with a careful description of the difficulties with "revival":
History does not supply conceptions of political life that can be ap-
plied mechanically to current problems. Circumstances change; theo-
retical commitments cannot be wrenched out of context without great
risk of distortion; contemporary social and legal issues can never be
resolved merely through recovery of features, however important and
attractive, of the distant past.8
3. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
4. See e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
5. See, e.g., Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976).
6. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1541.
7. There is an enormous literature on the subject. For an insightful guide, see Kerber, The Re-
publican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation, 37 AM. Q. 474 (1985).
8. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1539.
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In addition to these conceptual difficulties with the enterprise of revival,
Professor Sunstein notes the ethical undesirability of resuscitating much of
the tradition: the attractive elements of eighteenth-century republicanism
were closely intertwined with its elitism, racism, sexism, and militarism.
But despite these problems he insists that modern republicanism can and
ought to be a revival of the eighteenth-century tradition.
The first step in Professor Sunstein's argument for the significance of a
historical connection between his jurisprudence and the politics of the
founding era is to assert the importance of republican thought in the
framing period. The particular "home" of republican thought in Ameri-
can constitutionalism on this view is "in the work of the antifederalists;
and antifederalist thought has exerted a continuing influence on American
public law."9 Professor Sunstein is as a result particularly interested in
antifederalist views on such matters as equality, representation and
deliberation."
At this point in my representation of Professor Sunstein's historical ar-
gument, the reader well might be inclined to interpret him as making the
perfectly cogent claim that his republican revival is in fact a recapturing
of antifederalist thought, understood as an often submerged and even par-
adoxical, but nevertheless real, element in American constitutionalism."'
But this claim is not what Professor Sunstein intends, for the republican-
ism he wishes to revive can be found in the antifederalists' bitter oppo-
nents as well.12 Indeed, Professor Sunstein insists that the republican
themes of contemporary interest were also prominent in federalist
thought.1" While the federalists rejected "central features of traditional
republicanism""'-and perhaps rightly so ("the basic program of the fed-
eralists was ultimately vindicated" 1 )-they retained and embodied in the
Constitution crucial republican themes such as a belief in deliberation and
civic virtue and a concern to permit creative disagreement and citizen in-
volvement. The historical connection definitely does not consist of revivi-
fying antifederalism as a distinct tradition.
If federalism in the historical sense is not the opposing political system
against which Professor Sunstein's republican tradition is to be contrasted,
then the obvious candidate is liberalism. Most recent historical scholarship
on republicanism has wrestled with the liberal/republican dichotomy, and
9. Id. at 1547. See generally H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981)
(discussing antifederalist contributions to constitutionalism).
10. Id. at 1548-58.
11. Perhaps the most powerful and influential presentation of such a historical argument is L.
BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION (1978), in which Banning identifies important antifeder-
alist elements in the political thought of the Jeffersonian Republicans of the 1790's (who, far from
rejecting the Constitution, vociferously asserted their allegiance to it).
12. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1547.
13. Id. at 1559-62.
14. Id. at 1558.
15. Id. at 1566.
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recent efforts to utilize the concept of republicanism in constitutional law
often employ the concept as a basis for criticizing liberal constitutional-
ism."6 But Professor Sunstein's rejection of the liberal/republican dichot-
omy is if anything more unequivocal than his rejection of a federalist/
antifederalist polarity: "The opposition between liberal and republican
thought in the context of the framing is, however, largely a false one.
Only through a caricature of the tradition can liberalism be thought the
antonym to the species of republicanism that operated during the constitu-
tional period.' 7
Despite occasional ambiguities, Professor Sunstein does not accept the
chronological account of American political thought that sees an earlier
republicanism giving way in the founding era to a triumphant liber-
alism."' The republican revival, he insists, draws on a tradition that was
both liberal and republican, a tradition in which liberal thought was re-
ceptive to the very themes that Professor Sunstein sees as quintessentially
republican. 9 While the "most collectivist forms" of republicanism contra-
dict "the most atomistic versions of liberalism . . . . [riepublican thought,
understood in a certain way, is a prominent aspect of the liberal tradi-
tion."20 Even liberalism's characteristic concern with rights which, at one
point Professor Sunstein seems to castigate as "entirely foreign to republi-
canism,"'" is, it turns out, historically compatible with the republican
tradition.21
Professor Sunstein's unwillingness to posit any strong distinction be-
tween the liberalism and republicanism of the founders is crucial to his
constructive project, which he labels "liberal republicanism." But his con-
cern to join and even equate the liberal and republican themes leaves his
search for a historical connection in some confusion. Professor Sunstein
asserts that "[t]he fact that the American constitutional regime at its outset
owed a great deal to republican thought is an important corrective to ap-
proaches that purport to speak for the American constitutional tradition,
but proceed from pluralist premises or invoke prepolitical rights.1 23 But
he clearly portrays the founders' thought as a synthesis of republicanism
with early forms of pluralism and interest-group politics. He simply does
16. See, e.g., Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29
WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987).
17. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1567.
18. The classic presentation of this view is G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN RE-
PUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
19. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1566-71 (liberalism incorporates concern over deliberation
and equality and the rejection of sheer self-interest as an acceptable justification for political
decisions).
20. Id. at 1569.
21. Id. at 1551. Professor Sunstein presumably means that the concept of prepolitical rights is
"entirely foreign" to his modern republicanism; the idea and rhetoric of natural or propolitical rights
certainly was not foreign to many of the historical figures whom he would regard as "republican."
22. Id. at 1561-63.
23. Id. at 1563.
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not see a republican tradition, as distinct from liberalism, in the founding
era. Professor Sunstein well may be right to reject such a sharp historical
distinction (indeed, I think he is), but by doing so he makes it very diffi-
cult to imagine how founding era thought might serve as a corrective to
concepts that it already embodied.
In any event, the historical meaning of republicanism, I suggest, does
not matter in any crucial way for Professor Sunstein. Historic republican-
ism, he freely admits, is relevant for contemporary constitutionalism only
insofar as it possesses "contemporary relevance or appeal."24 This "rele-
vance or appeal" clearly is not a function of historical meaning and is not
subject to correction by historical tradition. If historical republicans be-
lieved in deliberation and sexism, Professor Sunstein will endorse the for-
mer and reject the latter for reasons that have nothing to do with history.
Modern republicanism, it seems, is interested only in those parts of the
language of the past that it can appropriate. Professor Sunstein does not
offer us historical republicanism and commend its virtues to us; he offers
us a contemporary political theory and notes that at times the founders
said similar things.
II. THE MEANING OF DELIBERATION
The core of republicanism for Professor Sunstein is the "characteristi-
cally republican belief in deliberative democracy." 25 Interest-group plural-
ism regards politics as a system "of aggregating citizen preferences" and
the task of constitutional theory as insuring that the prepolitical wants,
needs and ideas that citizens bring to politics are "reflected accurately" in
the political process. In contrast, republicans "treat politics as above all
deliberative; and deliberation is to cover ends as well as means."26 A re-
publican politics of deliberation therefore has a "transformative dimen-
sion" in that it requires political actors to reflect critically on their own
preferences, and to modify or reject those preferences in accordance with a
deliberative process which brings "new information and different perspec-
tives to bear" on one's own choices.
Deliberative criticism requires distance: Decision-makers must be able
to scrutinize their own and their constituents' preferences and predisposi-
tions. Public decisions (paradigmatically, the passage of legislation, but
Professor Sunstein recognizes the public nature of much that is nominally
"private") therefore cannot legitimately be the product of the interest-
group brokering of discordant private goals; "instead they require public-
regarding justifications offered after multiple points of view have been
24. Id. at 1563.
25. Id. at 1540.
26. Id. at 1548.
27. Id. at 1544.
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consulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely understood."28 Such a de-
liberative politics can only be "made possible by what is sometimes de-
scribed as 'civic virtue,' ,,2 by which Professor Sunstein means the capac-
ity of political actors "to ask not only what is in their private interest, but
also what will best serve the community in general."30 The effect of this
"requirement of deliberation" will be to produce, at least at times,
"uniquely correct outcomes" that are supported by "a consensus (or at
least broad agreement) among political equals."3"
"Deliberative democracy," as Professor Sunstein presents it, is an at-
tractive but, I believe, flawed concept. In the first place, it is unclear to
what extent the concept of deliberation is consistent with Professor Sun-
stein's concern for broad participation in the political process. Republi-
cans, we are told, "will attempt to design political institutions that pro-
mote discussion and debate among the citizenry," but they will also
"attempt to insulate political actors from private pressure." 32 How are
these two goals to be combined? Professor Sunstein discusses with appar-
ent approval the founders' efforts to foster "deliberative government"
through indirect elections, legislative autonomy, and the rejection of a con-
stituent right to instruct representatives. Such institutional arrangements,
however, are premised on assumptions that contradict a belief in par-
ticipatory or "strong" democracy:33 a distrust in at least the wisdom of the
citizen body generally, and a corresponding confidence that a select and
autonomous body of representatives are more likely to make intelligent
and virtuous decisions for the public good than is the public itself. 4 Pro-
fessor Sunstein's argument for deliberative politics unintentionally sounds
very much like an argument for government by an independent judiciary,
which is scarcely a program for broad political participation.
My second concern with the concept of deliberation involves the consis-
tency with which Professor Sunstein rejects "prepolitical and exogenous"
28. Id. at 1575. Professor Sunstein goes on immediately to describe this account of deliberative
decision-making as "the foundation of contemporary republicanism." Id.
29. Id. at 1541.
30. Id. at 1550.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1549.
33. See B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
34. This combination of an asserted belief in broad political participation with a desire to create a
distance between the public and its governors is, of course, a common theme in the thought of histori-
cal figures we might call republican. See e.g., Letter from Jefferson to Pierre S. Dupont de Nemours
(April 24, 1816), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (E. Dumbauld ed. 1955)
("the people by which is meant the mass of individuals composing the society . . . being unqualified
for the management of affairs requiring intelligence above the common level, yet competent judges of
human character, they choose, for their management, representatives ...."); see also id. at 38 n.1 12
(Jefferson's concern for the state senate was "to get the wisest men chosen, and to make them per-
fectly independent when chosen"). The latter remark is quoted by Professor Sunstein in connection
with a discussion of "the traditional republican faith in the value of virtue and deliberation" Sunstein,
supra note 2, at 1560.
1708 [Vol. 97: 1703
Reviving Republicanism
rights and interests.35 He repeatedly insists that a "central point" of re-
publican deliberation is its capacity to question and modify pre-existing
values, and its unwillingness to rule out discussion and debate over the
same set of "prepolitical concerns." But this description of deliberation
does not seem to me to be consistently maintained. Professor Sunstein is
not willing in fact to open all private preferences to public examination.
The clearest example of this unacknowledged limit on deliberation is reli-
gion. Professor Sunstein stresses that "some issues-religion is a familiar
example-should be entirely off-limits to politics"; 3 6 "certain considera-
tions-like religion or political affiliation" should not be taken into
account."
'37
At first glance such an exclusionary rule seems inexplicable. If, for ex-
ample, the present distribution of wealth is open for deliberative debate,
why must we not discuss present-day secularism (or civic religion) as
well? Professor Sunstein's response is twofold: "This exclusion of religion
from politics has been based both on the notion that religious conviction is
a matter of private right and on the view that removal of religion from the
political agenda protects republican politics by ensuring against stalemate
and factionalism." 3 Neither of these rationales for excluding religion
from public discourse is reconcilable with Professor Sunstein's general ac-
count of deliberation. The notion of religion as "a matter of private right"
is in direct contradiction to his assertion that the concept of prepolitical
rights is "entirely foreign to republicanism," and thus can only be justified
on grounds that he himself would label anti-republican. The argument
that religion must be excluded in order to prevent "stalemate and faction-
alism" is, if anything, even more deeply contradictory, for it suggest a
fundamental limit on the capacity of civic virtue to guide political debate.
If religion is so disruptive that it must be excluded from discussion, why
can not the same be said of property rights (and indeed at least part of the
founders' concern over property was a concern over the social unrest that
wealth redistribution might inspire39 ).
A third problem with the concept of deliberation lies in the claim that it
can settle "at least some normative disputes with substantively right an-
swers" 40 or "uniquely correct outcomes." '41 While Professor Sunstein is
careful not to make grandiose claims about deliberation's capacity gener-
ally to transcend interest-group brokering and moral relativism, he does
insist that at least "in some settings" political decisions can be made that
35. Id. at 1541.
36. Id. at 1555.
37. Id. at 1568; see also id. at 1563, where Professor Sunstein states that the founders' "incorpo-
ration of Calvinism" into their thought "should not be revived."
38. Id. at 1555 n.85.
39. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
40. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1541.
41. Id. at 1550.
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are "substantively correct" implementations of the common good.42 This is
an ambitious assertion, for a vision of politics that could deliver on this
claim would be able thereby to resolve one of the thorniest questions of
contemporary American political and constitutional theory.
Constitutional deliberation as described by Professor Sunstein unfortu-
nately fails to escape the "thin" morality of process that characterizes
most mainstream liberal constitutionalism. "[S]ubstantively correct out-
comes," for the modern republican, are "understood as such through the
ultimate criterion of agreement among political equals", and the "common
good" is defined as the outcome of a "well-functioning deliberative pro-
cess." 3 The correctness of a specific political decision is to be judged by
the legitimacy of its claim to rest on a "a consensus (or at least broad
agreement) among political equals" after deliberation. These stringently
procedural definitions of "correct" and "good" are complemented by a
strict process definition of "objectionable" or "unjustified" political out-
comes: "certain results could not be the product of a genuine deliberative
process.""" Republicanism's common good is scarcely distinguishable from
pluralism's aggregation and balancing of interests, for Professor Sunstein
gives us no criterion for determining the justice of "deliberative" political
decisions other than the requirement that political actors articulate a pub-
lic rationale for their positions.45 That is a requirement that the histories
of legislation and of minimal rationality review would suggest is formal
and empty.
My most fundamental concern with the concept of deliberation has to
do not with its internal inconsistencies but with its underlying premises.
The claim that free and equal deliberation among political equals will
lead to "uniquely correct" political decisions is an assertion of faith. Pro-
fessor Sunstein seems to reject "character formation"-the transformation
of persons and personal relationships-as a legitimate object of public de-
liberation and decision, but he never explains how untransformed persons,
culturally molded by the modern West's atomistic individualism, will be
capable of conducting a deliberative and transformative politics. 48 Profes-
sor Sunstein does not offer us the "credible theory of social transforma-
42. Id. at 1550, 1554.
43. Id. at 1554.
44. Id. at 1550 n.54.
45. Modern theorists of ethics disagree sharply over the possibility of constructing a substantive
morality from a set of liberal process constraints on political discussion. Compare B. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (arguing in the affirmative) with A. MACINTYRE,
supra note 1 (arguing the contrary).
46. Eighteenth century republicanism was ultimately linked to a particular vision of human per-
sonality involving notions of fame, honor and virtue that simply are absent from our culture. See R.
WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 7-66 (1984). It is not self-evident that we can appro-
priate or sustain the one without the other.
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tion" and the "vision of transformed personal relations"' 7 necessary to
render plausible his optimistic evaluation of the effects of deliberation.
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Sunstein is one of the most creative constitutional scholars of
the contemporary academy. It is wholly unsurprising, therefore, that "Be-
yond the Republican Revival" articulates a variety of important and inno-
vative legal and constitutional arguments. His suggestions regarding statu-
tory construction and group representation, in particular, deserve careful
consideration by academics, judges and politicians. It is, ironically, those
elements in his project that give it its title of republican revival that seem
to me most problematic. Professor Sunstein identifies only a quite attenu-
ated relationship between his ideas and specific schools of thought in the
founding era. This need not be a disadvantage, for as Professor Sunstein
is well aware, eighteenth-century republicanism was by no means an en-
tirely attractive phenomenon. Indeed the claim that his constitutional the-
ory is a revival of an earlier tradition does little to clarify or support cru-
cial concepts such as deliberation and common good. The meaning and
value of those concepts should be addressed "straightforwardly as issues of
political theory" and, I would add, of constitutional law for, as Professor
Sunstein himself notes, "[c]ontemporary republicanism is more to be made
than found."'"
47. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MovEMENT 22, 25 (1986). One of the many
strengths of Professor Unger's work is his recognition that a transformative politics requires a trans-
formative account of personality. See also R. UNGER, PASSION (1984); R. UNGER, POLITIcs (1987-).
48. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1589.
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